HELL to PAY by D,M. Giangreco |
Hell to Pay: Operation Downfall and the invasion of Japan,
1945-47 by Dennis Giangreco:
The Japanese military code, the Senjinkun or Instructions
for the Battlefield, forbid Imperial Japanese forces from retreating and surrendering.
This doctrine is exemplified in the battles of Iwo Jima, Saipan, and Okinawa.
As an example of Senjinkun, all 27,000 Japanese soldiers fought to the death at
Saipan and only 7,000 soldiers from over 110,000 survived at Okinawa. However,
by 1945 the Japanese had already lost the war, with the Soviet invasion of
Manchuria, the destruction of the Combined Fleet, and American preparations for
the invasion of the Japanese home islands. The question became: on what
conditions would Japan surrender?
Hell to Pay does a brilliant job of examining the
strategies, logistics, and planning of Operation Downfall and the Japanese home
island defence: Operation Ketsugo. With more than 3 million soldiers deployed
on the home islands, millions more available for conscription, and thousands of
kamikaze fighters, Japan was prepared for a bloody war of attrition.
Conservative estimates projected more than 1 million American casualties and
between 5 - 10 million Japanese casualties. The planning and projections of
Operation Downfall gives insight on the American decision to deploy atomic
weapons, thus avoiding the estimated millions of casualties and protracting the
war.
Depending on your point of reference on when the war
started, July 7, 1937 the Marco Polo Bridge incident, December 7, 1941 Pearl
Harbour, or skirmishes with China since 1931, Imperial Japan had been at war
far longer than the United States. War had become a way of life for Japanese
society, 3 - 5 million casualties sustained in China alone, mass conscriptions,
extreme rationing, shortages of all goods from sugar, jet fuel, and metals.
Given these factors, the Japanese government appeared willing to accept further
losses and continuing the war. In contrast, Giangreco examines American war weariness
and manpower shortages, as the United States had already sustained hundreds of
thousands casualties in Europe. A long protracted war on the Japanese home islands
with mass casualties could harm continued public support for the war.
Giangreco also examines alternatives to Operation Downfall. I.e.
blockading Japan into surrender and continued strategic bombing. However, these
options seemed insufficient in forcing a Japanese surrender due to extending
the war beyond 1947, sustainability, and lack of public support for a protracted war.
Though Giangreco does mention the possibility of a Soviet
invasion of the Japanese home islands, I would have liked more insight into
possible Soviet participation in Operation Downfall or the Soviets launching
their own separate invasion. For instance, the Soviets received naval transfers
from the United States through Project Hula for a possible invasion. Although
Soviet Pacific Fleet had developed battle plans for a possible invasion of
Hokkaido, any Soviet invasion would have raised a different set of questions.
The Race to Berlin was essentially a Cold War calculation in which the Soviets
and Western Allies seized as much territory as possible in preparation for the
Cold War; imagine a Race to Tokyo and occupation zones, the Soviets controlling
Hokkaido and the United States controlling Kyushu and Honshu. However, this is
a topic for another time. I came to realize that this copy of Hell to Pay is the 2009 edition; there is a 2017 updated and
expanded edition that discusses Soviet-American cooperation.
Overall, Hell to Pay is a recommended and sobering read for
those interested in the final year of World War 2. The book is superbly
detailed i.e., covering such topics as the types of aircraft the Japanese were
deploying for kamikaze attacks to which American divisions were tasked to take
particular regions of Kyushu. Other recommended reading The Rising Sun: Decline
and Fall of the Japanese Empire by John Toland. To reiterate, read the 2017
updated and expanded edition.
Reviewed by Lorne Lee
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